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abstract. I present an analysis of the notion of epistemic modali-
ties, based on an appropriate interpretation of two basic constructivist
issues: veriﬁcation and epistemic agency. Starting from an histori-
cal analysis of conditions for judgments, I analyze ﬁrst the reading
of necessity with respect to apodictic judgements, and then that of
possibility with respect to hypothetical judgement. The analyis re-
sults in a formal treatment of rules for judgemental modal operators,
whose aim is to preserve epistemic states corresponding to veriﬁed
and unveriﬁed assumptions in contexts. In the conclusion, further
tracks of research are indicated for designing a semantic framework
and deﬁning multi-agents systems.
1 Introduction
Since Brouwer's dissertation Over de grondslagen der Wiskunde,1 followed
by Heyting's formalization of intuitionistic logic2 and the later Construc-
tivist perspective,3 logical anti-realism has evolved from a non-classical set-
ting for the formalization of mathematics to a more extended and demand-
ing conceptual framework for formal logical languages. Constructivism, in
particular, has strengthened the philosophical orientation of intuitionistic
mathematics and has reformulated some of the most important intuitions
behind anti-realism. Nowadays, two issues can be located at the heart of
the philosophical analysis that constructivism has brought forth in logic:
veriﬁcationism and epistemic agency.4 The importance of these topics for
logic and formal epistemology in general is conﬁrmed by the great deal of
attention they are recently claiming in diﬀerent areas of philosophical and
mathematical logic, in game and decision theories and in artiﬁcial intelli-
gence and social choice theory. Their combination represents probably the
very core of Constructivism intended as a philosophical framework, and the
1Brouwer (1907), republished in Brouwer (1975).
2See e.g. Heyting (1956).
3For a systematic introduction, see Troelstra and van Dalen (1988).
4For a recent analysis of the realism and anti-realism debate which focuses on these
two issues among others, see Brock and Mares (2007).
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aim of the present contribution is to uncover some connections between a
philosophical analysis of constructive logic and knowledge. In particular, I
shall give some new insights in the interpretation of epistemic attitudes by
knowing subjects in terms of constructive modalities.
The nature of proofs as ideals for the deﬁnition of truth, the reinterpre-
tation of truth-values as proof-conditions and the reading of logical connec-
tives in terms of introduction and elimination rules, have all been crucial
steps in the development of the intuitionistic/constructivist approach to
the philosophical analysis of logic. In particular, the issue of veriﬁcations,
introduced already by Frege in the treatment of identity procedures for
canonical deﬁnitions, was dealt with by the Positivist in terms of obser-
vation protocols at the beginning of the 1920's,5, and later by Dummett's
theory of proof-conditions.6 In the anti-realistic perspective, the veriﬁca-
tion principle `truth = existence of a proof' requires a solid philosophical
basis: What does it mean to prove or verify a given propositional content?
Under which conditions does such a veriﬁcation become acceptable? Are
degrees of certainty allowed within the deﬁnition of truth as possession of a
proof? The formulation of appropriate answers needs to be given in terms
not only of the formal rules that allow the constructively acceptable deriva-
tion of a theorem; It rather concerns also the level of assertions of truth
for such propositional contents (`proposition A is true'), and therefore it
requires an appropriate analysis of assertion conditions for judgements. In
the following, this last topic plays a main role in view of the analysis of
modal judgements.
On the other hand, the role of the epistemic agent for assertions of knowl-
edge can be traced back to Kant's epistemology. Brouwer's theory of two-ity,
based on the method of the creating subject, constituted the philosophical
background for the intuitionistic reformulation of the method of proof by
contradiction.7 The issue of the knowing subject has recently been restored
according to the constructivist point of view in terms of the `ﬁrst-person
perspective' approach to the judgement-based process of knowledge acqui-
sition. In view of the recent developments of modal and epistemic logics,
where the role of the epistemic actor is explicitly formulated in the lan-
guage,8 it would be obvious to expect from the anti-realistic approach (and
thus from the constructivist perspective in particular) to play a major role
in this constantly growing track of research. This means to allow an explicit
5See e.g. Ayer (1959).
6See Dummett (1977), Dummett (1993).
7See van Atten (2008).
8The explicit formulation of an agent-operator transforms standard formulas in the
form KaA, where K is the epistemic/modal operator; Index a stands for the knowing
agent; A stands for the propositional content to which knowledge is directed.
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analysis of the agent's attitude towards the content of the knowledge act
(`proposition A is true/proven by agent a'), and to reconsider in this direc-
tion the previously mentioned analysis of assertion conditions. What does
it mean for an agent to prove a given propositional content, i.e. under which
conditions a content is proven by an agent? Which degrees of provability
are admitted in the context of an agent-based judgemental theory of knowl-
edge? How to deal with the communication of these knowledge contents,
i.e. how to avoid a solipsistic deviation of such a theory of knowledge?9 The
formal and conceptual analyses oﬀered by frameworks such as Constructive
Type Theory (CTT) and the Logic of Proofs (LP) are particularly apt to
play this role.10
In connection with intuitionistic logic and the structure of proofs, the
role of modalities has been recently explored in a large number of research
areas.11 Nonetheless, despite their milestone character in the explanation of
knowledge attitudes since the debate on the role of hypothetical judgement
in intuitionistic logic from Brouwer (1907), and even though the analysis of
epistemic acts has become essential for the cognitive act and the meaning
of mood,12 no consistent explanation of epistemic modalities exists which
has a non-purely arithmetical interpretation. The main aim of this paper
is hence to focus on an epistemic interpretation of modalities and to ana-
lyze them formally from a ﬁrst-person perspective of judgemental knowledge
processes. This shall be done especially in view of the nature of construc-
9Thanks to Catarina Duthil Novaes for suggesting an explicit mention of the problem
of solipsism in the present framework of modal judgemental constructive knowledge.
10Martin-Löf's Type Theory, ﬁrst introduced in Martin-Löf (1975), has been revised
and reformulated in the strongly predicative format of Constructive Type Theory in
Martin-Löf (1998). For comparison with Artemov's Logic of Proof, I shall refer in par-
ticular to Artemov (1994) and Artemov (2001). The philosophical and foundational
perspective oﬀered by Constructive Type Theory has been investigated at length in
a number of aspects. B.G. Sundholm has explored a great number of issues that
constitute the basis for the present contribution. In the following I will hit upon
themes such as the relation between proof-conditions and truth-makers, considered in
Sundholm (1994); the formulation of knowledge judgements from the ﬁrst-person per-
spective, as in Sundholm (1997); the relation between the constructive and the classi-
cal notions of inference, Sundholm (1998); the issue of identity of assertion conditions,
Sundholm (1999). In Sundholm (2003), he has oﬀered a constructive semantics for propo-
sitions and judgements which spells out the notion of epistemic necessity: I will, in the
following, make an extensive comparative analysis of this work, in order to present a
more complete account of epistemic modalities.
11Among other works, of the greatest importance are the sequential approach from
Sambin and Valentini (1982), the general formulation of an intuitionistic modal logic
in Bierman and de Paiva (2000), the interpretation under the Curry-Howard correspon-
dence in Bellin et al. (2001) and the natural deduction reading of contextual reasoning
in de Paiva (2003).
12As it has been recently considered in van der Schaar (2007) for CTT.
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tive modalities, their role for epistemic agency and the analysis of assertion
conditions for judgements.13 I will argue that an epistemic interpretation
of modalities is given by a crucial attitude towards knowledge contents, by
analysing their assertion conditions. This analysis will not be propositional,
in the form `(Agent a knows that) A is necessary/possible;' rather, it will
be given with respect to the related judgemental formulation: `(Agent a
necessarily/possibly knows that) `A is true.' In this latter form, modalities
require an analysis that considers the judgement at hand both in its apodic-
tic and hypothetical form. This allows to reformulate their constructive in-
terpretation by proof-object and assertion conditions. The here introduced
analysis allows moreover for an extension in terms of prioritized structures
and multi-agents languages. The implications of these latter issues shall
only be sketched towards the end of this contribution.
2 From Constructions to Conditions
The notion of construction  as the formal counterpart to truth-value for
connectives in a classical logic setting  has been considered systematically
at least since Heyting's work, and its analysis has received a new impulse
with Kreisel's interpretation.14 This led to the translation of the deﬁnition
of meaning based on alethic conditions to one based on epistemic conditions.
A crucial step in the formulation of epistemic conditions for proposi-
tional connectives is represented by the interpretation of hypothetical judge-
ments. The peculiar nature of such form of judgement was obvious already
to Brouwer15 and it can be taken as the basis for his explanation of the
relation between intuitionistic logic and (mathematical) knowledge. In the
third part of his dissertation, titled Wiskunde en Logica, Brouwer deals
explicitly with the seemingly innate hypothetical nature of logical reasoning,
the one where logic seems to proceed ahead of mathematics:
There is a special case, where the combination of syllogism has a diﬀerent nature,
that appears to resemble the usual logical ﬁgures, and which really seems to pre-
suppose the hypothetical judgement from logic. This occurs when a construction
is deﬁned through some relation in a construction, without being directly evident
how to provide it. It seems one assumes here that the sought was constructed, and
a chain of hypothetical judgements derives from the assumptions.16
13Such explanation refers mainly to the epistemic analysis of dependent judgements
for CTT introduced in Primiero (2008); it is crucially based on the description of the
role of assumptions and presuppositions, following Primiero (2004), and it focuses ex-
plicitly on an agent-based deﬁnition of information, as shown in Primiero (2007). The
proper semantic interpretation of this notion of information is extensively analyzed in
Primiero (2009).
14See Heyting (1956), Kreisel (1962); see Sundholm (1983) for an overview.
15See Brouwer (1907).
16Brouwer (1907), pp.124-125. The explanation of the very diﬀerent interpretations of
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The kind of construction involved by hypothetical judgements is central
to the understanding of the intuitionistic inference relation. The reading
of the implication sign from a BHK-style semantics reﬂects this very same
diﬃculty. Let us mention two standard interpretations:
Kreisel (1962): The implication p → q can be asserted, if and only if we possess a
construction r, which, joined to any construction proving p (supposing the latter
be eﬀected), would automatically eﬀect a construction proving q;
van Dalen (1979): A proof p of A → B is a construction which assigns to each
proof q of A a proof p(q) [p, provided that q] of B, plus a veriﬁcation that p indeed
satisﬁes these conditions.
According to these standard readings, the satisfaction of the epistemic
condition on a proof p for the connective → applied to the couple of propo-
sitional contents A and B requires two separate operations to be performed:
the formulation of a construction a for A, along with a construction b for B,
the latter being deduced from a in terms of explicitly or implicitly given tau-
tologies.17 The latter condition on tautologies requires that any step from
the ﬁrst construction to the latter can be performed according to deﬁnitions
and logical laws.
Sundholm (1983) has argued for the basic distinction between the expla-
nation of an implicational relation and the process of constructing such a
proof-object: The hypothetical method  one of the allowed construction
methods in intuitionistic logic  is the corresponding abstracted process.
Under Sundholm's reasoning, the explanation provided by the formula `for
all q: q proves A⇒ p(q) proves B,' cannot itself be regarded as a mathemat-
ical object. This is essentially due to the distinction between the dynamic
process that is the act of proving, and the resulting mathematical object
that is a proof. Hence, in particular for the construction stating that `A is
a proposition,' the assertion condition cannot be propositional itself.18
The way out of this impasse is represented by the constructive distinction
between act of knowledge and its content: To demonstrate the truth of a
proposition A one needs to carry out the construction a which corresponds
to a proof-object for A, which will in turn allow to state the judgement
`proposition A is true.' This sets the basic constructive distinction between
proposition and judgement. In turn, also the analysis of conditions is ex-
tended: Proof-conditions formulated for propositional contents are reconsid-
ered as assertion conditions for judgements. I aim to show in the following
the nature of hypothetical judgements in the history of intuitionistic and constructive
logic is presented in a quite detailed and fascinating way in van Atten (in press); my
personal thanks to Mark van Atten for providing me with a preprint.
17This is called the α-interpretation in van Atten (in press).
18See Sundholm (1983), pp.161-165. As I have recalled in my Primiero (2008), this
reﬂects the Russellian distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how.
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that the former are explicitely identiﬁed with the latter only in the case of
categorical judgements, and in the case of hypothetical judgements only un-
der the explicit requirement of closed constructions. This is shown starting
from the basic distinction between implication among propositional contents
and inference between judgements.
The just mentioned basic distinction between categorical and hypothet-
ical judgement is fully endorsed by Martin-Löf's Type Theory.19 The for-
mulation of propositional contents A,B for the judgment `A → B true,'
and justiﬁed in terms of constructions, provides the following analysis of
the implicational relation:
Proof Conditions-interpretation: A proof p of `A→ B true' is given as the pair
of proof-objects < a, b >, such that one obtains a formal object of a function type
f =< a, b >, which is the construction for the implicational relation f : (A→ B).
The ground distinction between this standard constructive implicational re-
lation and the inferential hypothetical relation is expressed by the resulting
switch from formal constructions to assertion conditions. Whereas by the
implicational relation one obtains a categorical object of the function type
f : (A → B), corresponding to a categorical judgement satisﬁed by the
ordered pair of constructions < a, b >; In the assertion conditions inter-
pretation of the inferential relation, one requires a dependent object which
represents a new functional relation of the form f : (x : A)B; The infer-
ential relation is therefore justiﬁed by a formal construction for B whose
formulation depends on condition x :A.
The construction of such formal object f : (x : A)B, is given by the
implicational relation abstracted with respect to all possible instances of
the construction a:
(1)
x :A ` b :B
λ((x)b) :A→ B.
The object f : (x : A)B denotes a dependent function type, that is the
type that contains all the functions with domain A and range B such that
f(a) :B for all a of type A. The values satisfying this function deﬁne the
hypothetical judgement, or logical consequence, `If A is true, then B is
true:'20
Assertion Conditions-interpretation: In order to establish `A true ⇒ B true,'
one requires that the satisfaction of the conditions that make the proposition A
true, can be transformed constructively into the satisfaction of the conditions that
make the proposition B true.
19See Martin-Löf (1987) and Primiero (2008), especially chapter 2, section 2.
20Such an explanation corresponds to what has been formulated in van Atten (in press)
as the β-interpretation.
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The explicit requirement on the constructive transformation of satisﬁable
conditions is similar to that of the previous implicational relation (deﬁni-
tions plus logical laws).
This distinction reﬂects the switch from construction (proof ) to
process-of-construction (proving), according to the requirement from
Sundholm (1983). Hence, assertion conditions for f : (A → B) rely on
the ordered pairs of constructions a :A and b :B deﬁning f , provided that A
and B are both of the type of propositions: A,B :prop (the latter represent
the due presuppositions allowing for the required constructions); The last
condition on type-introductions expresses type-predicability, which corre-
sponds to knowability in view of the deﬁnition of truth as knowledge.21 On
the other hand, the formal expression f : (x : A)B requires two separate
such conditions: the ﬁrst is the type declaration for B (B : prop), allowed
by the formulation of a construction b :B; The second condition (on which
such construction b depends) is the assumption (x :A) that declares that a
construction of A is given. In other words, provided the veriﬁcation of the
assumption on the truth of A, it is possible to formulate the construction
b. Also in this case a principle of knowability is at hand for the conditions
on constructions.22 It is at this second stage that an important step occurs
in the constructive perspective: The introduction of the assumption x :A
and the generalization thereof is allowed by term introduction, i.e., by the
presence of some a which can be substituted for the place-holder x; This
means in other words that the assertion conditions interpretation relies ulti-
mately on the proof conditions of the corresponding implicational relation.
This interpretation allows therefore the generalization on the application of
identical proof objects a1, . . . , an for the ordered pair < ai, b > that build
all the valid implicational relations A→ B. On the other hand, this reading
clearly misses the aim of providing an interpretation for hypothetical rea-
soning under simple assumption on the formulation of such constructions
ai, that is for the pure reason of expressing what one should know, in order
the conclusion to be inferred.
There is therefore an important distinction in the shift from construc-
tions to assertion conditions. On what Martin-Löf calls the conceptual or-
der, this shows knowability to be presupposed by actual knowledge: This
principle, which might result trivial for categorical judgements, reveals the
requirement of an explicit veriﬁcation procedure in the case of hypotheti-
cal judgements. It opens therefore the up-to-now scarcely explored issue of
21In Primiero (2004) I have suggested the use of the notion of meaningfulness as an
appropriate counterpart of the standard veriﬁcationist deﬁnition of meaning for type-
introductions.
22For more on this and the connection to the notion of function see Primiero (2008),
pp.47-54.
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derivations under open assumptions in the construcitve setting. It is intu-
itive to translate this epistemic relation in terms of provability and knowl-
edge and to show their connection to the notion of logical necessity. In view
of the proposed account, it seems appropriate to reconsider this issue from
the perspective of the epistemic interpretation of modalities, including both
necessity and possibility. In particular, the reading of epistemic modalities
in terms of assertion conditions proceeds in two directions:
1. it preserves the usual reading of necessity satisfying the constructive
interpretation of the provability predicate (semantically satisﬁed in a
modal language S4 for factual truth);
2. it provides an embedded reading of possibility that interprets the
agent-based perspective of assertion conditions in a weaker frame for
open assumptions.
I shall investigate the resulting notion of constructive knowledge under
an interpretation that does not consider necessity as arithmetical provabil-
ity, rather from the perspective of agent-based justiﬁed knowledge, where
modalities are intended as expressing epistemic attitudes.
3 Constructive modalities as epistemic attitudes
The explanation of the notions of construction (process of proving) and
proof (object that shows what is proved) in the previous section leads to the
distinction between proof-conditions for propositions and assertion condi-
tions for judgements: First one goes through the process of satisfying all
the conditions needed for proving a proposition A, and then one obtains
the object that allows one to assert that `A is true.' In the case of a cate-
gorical judgement, the notion of assertion condition simply reduces to that
of proof-object for the propositional content at hand; On the other hand,
whereas the standard constructive interpretation of dependent (hypothet-
ical) judgements obtains the same by requiring the substitution of closed
construction for assumptions, the extension to conditions becomes enlight-
ening when looking at a formulation of dependency from open assumptions.
This last step is essential to provide an interpretation of modalities as epis-
temic attitudes for the constructive framework.
Martin-Löf (1996) introduces an analysis of the notion of hypothetical
judgement based on the comparison with Gentzen style sequents, consid-
ering the required presuppositions for the formulation of antecedents (or
hypotheses) (A1, . . . , An). That `A1 is true' is a judgement presupposes,
according to such explanation, that A1 is a proposition; and that `A2 is
true' is a judgement under the assumption that A1 holds, presupposes that
A2 is a proposition and that A1 is true, and so on up to An:
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< prop : type >
(A1 :prop)A1 true
(A1 : true)A2 :prop
...
(A1 : true, . . . , An−1 : true)An : true.
This shows the intuitionistic formulation of hypothetical judgements based
on presuppositions and satisﬁed assumptions. An interpretation of modal-
ities as epistemic attitudes for the constructive framework  extending the
usual interpretation of the necessity operator with a special reading for the
possibility operator  aims at illustrating the connected epistemic values of
proof-objects and (open) assumptions.
The ﬁrst step in formulating the connection between epistemic attitudes
and constructive modalities is obviously the direct translation of intuition-
istic truth as classical provability in terms of necessity, as introduced by
Gödel's modal calculus of provability.23 As recollected in Artemov (2001),
Gödel's introduction of the modal reading of intuitionistic provability estab-
lishes that a intuitionistically derivable formula F implies a formula t(F )
with proof-term t derivable in S4 such that each subformula of F is boxed:
`Int F ⇒ `S4 t(F ) | ∀A ⊆ F,`S4 2A.
The inverse was established by McKinsey and Tarski (1948). Nonetheless,
the intended semantics of the provability operator Provable(F ) with respect
to S4 and for 2F were to be found diﬀerent. Gödel intended the provability
predicate to denote the form `x is a code of a proof of a formula having a code
y' for a theory containing Peano Arithmetic (PA), such that a translation is
possible where 2 means `it is provable in PA.' But the problem arises with
the non-constructive nature of the existential quantiﬁer, which implies that
the reﬂection principle Provable(F )→ F is not derivable. The appropriate
semantics for 2F is then given in Artemov (2001) as the derivability of the
explicit version of the provability predicate Provable(n, F ) → F for any
natural number n.24 The corresponding modal logic of the arithmetical
provability predicate Provable(F ) was given in Solovay (1976). This has
an identical counterpart in the formulation `Proof(A) exists' which deﬁnes
constructively `proposition A is true:' `a is a proof-object for A' (a : A)
justiﬁes A true.
23Gödel (1933).
24It also provides a complete axiom system for a classical propositional logic with the
additional axiom `t is a proof of T ' (t : T ) , and the classical BHK semantics for Int is
formulated.
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Considering the more recent approach to modal languages to formulate
properties of epistemic subjects involved in intelligent processes of knowl-
edge acquisition and exchange, and provided the innate nature of construc-
tivism to deal with the notion of knowledge and judgement from a ﬁrst
person perspective, it seems reasonable to require a reading of justiﬁcations
(and in turn of modalities) not only in view of arithmetical provability,25
but also as epistemic attitudes of knowing agents. Such a non-standard
interpretation underlines the distinction between the pure provability of a
given propositional content A and the description of conditions under which
an agent can prove/has proven A. This is the very aim of the present and
following sections. In such context, the mentioned switch from formulas to
judgements, leading to the reading of assertion conditions along with proof-
conditions, plays an important role for the epistemic interpretation of the
standard possibility operator.
Sundholm (2003) presents the diﬀerent interpretations of the necessity
operator applied to the judgemental form `proposition A is true.' The fol-
lowing diﬀerent readings are provided:
1. Necessarily A is true;
2. A is necessarily true;
3. `A is true' is necessary.
In the ﬁrst form, the judgement declares the truth of the proposition 2A;
In the second form, it is a form of judgement, where necessity is expressed as
a form of predicating the truth; In the third form, a judgement `A is true' is
declared to be necessary. Sundholm claims that modal logic accounts only
for the ﬁrst reading; The contentual approach required by a constructivist's
(anti-formalist) perspective suggests the connection to necessity as truth in
all possible worlds, and when the semantic truth-conditions are reﬂected by
syntactic proof-terms in the constructive vein, equi-assertability (or identity
of assertion conditions) allows for readings 1 and 2 to be identiﬁed. The
kind of necessity declared by the third form is diﬀerent, because it applies
in a proper sense to a judgement. The judgement 2(A true), and the
related possibility version, are the forms of modal judgements I will refer to
throughout the rest of this paper.
The meaning of judgemental necessity 2(A true) needs to be interpreted
in terms of assertion conditions. Provided that the conditions for having
the right to express a judgement are satisﬁed, the corresponding notion
of necessity for a judgement-candidate is that of an apodictic judgement :
25See e.g. the one given in Fitting (2005).
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what is known to be so and cannot be known to be otherwise. Hence, the
constructive interpretation that identiﬁes provability, truth and knowledge
(that a proposition A is true means that a proof for A is known), allows to
justify the following extension:26
4. `A is true' is necessary ⇒ `A is true' is known
2(A true)⇒ K(A true).
Here K can be seen as a knowledge-operator, in the style of the mentioned
systems of epistemic logic, or as an explicit operator for the knowing agent.
Necessity and knowledge relate here in terms of inference under assertion
conditions, rather than by equivalence of such conditions: We shall see that
necessary knowledge is implied only by knowledge under an empty set of
conditions.
For the previously introduced analysis of assertion conditions, the notion
of judgemental knowledge needs to be understood as satisfaction of the con-
ditions for the judgement `A is true.' The basic condition for the truth of A
is the construction a that makes it true (a :A); When A presupposes further
propositions to be known, these represent the context in which A is known
to be true, Γ = (A1 true, . . . , An true); then the notation (Γ)A true will be
used. Thus, when 2(A true) is referred to contextually formulated knowl-
edge, one needs to give explicit satisfaction procedures for each xi :Ai ∈ Γ,
in line with the constructivist requirement. We can see this as providing
the condition for the reduction to the implicational relation
∧
Ai → A, so
that it corresponds to knowledge for which no further contextual conditions
are needed (Γ = ∅):
5. `A is true' is necessary ⇔ Agent K knows that A, for any knowledge
state agent K is in
2(A true)⇔ K((∅)A true).
The latter represents a crucial step: `alethic'(/modal-theoretical) necessity
as truth in all possible worlds corresponds directly to the `epistemic'(/proof-
26Sundholm (2003). In the following, when the symbol⇒ occurs among (modal) judge-
ments (`A is true'), such symbol is not to be intended as the propositional connective of
implication, rather as a meta-theoretical sign of inferential assertability. It can be read
as follows: If the conditions to assert X are satisﬁed, then the conditions to assert Y
must be satisﬁed as well (where here X and Y are meta-variable for judgements). Cor-
respondingly, the bidirectional arrow ⇔ expresses identity of assertion conditions for the
judgements on the two sides. Thanks to Maria van der Schaar for having pointed out to
me the possible confusion.
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theoretical) satisfaction of proof-conditions, including satisfaction of as-
sumptions, which means derivation from premises.27
The corresponding interpretation of a judgemental possibility operator
can now be provided. Let us consider the propositional equivalence 2A↔
¬3¬A, then the following is formulated in Sundholm (2003):
6. `A is true' is possible ⇔ `A is false' is not known
3(A true)⇔ ¬2(¬A true).
This equivalence is based on the fact that the right-hand side formula ex-
presses that it is not known that `A is false,' which obviously does not
allow constructively to say that `A is true.' But this use of the possibility
operator does not give yet a corresponding interpretation on the syntax of
judgements, which also shows how under this reading the duality on the two
modal operators is partially lost. One can obtain such translation based on
the previous remark on assertion conditions as contextual knowledge, by
referring to conditions needed for knowledge that can be satisﬁed, but not
necessarily are:
7. Agent K knows that A, for some knowledge state Γ agent K is in
3(A true)⇒ K((Γ)A true).
For this to make a diﬀerence with respect to the reading of the necessity op-
erator, we need to interpret the context Γ as the set of data or information on
which the construction of A depends, without the reduction to a proof-bject
for the implication relation being guaranteed. In other words, one needs to
keep the reasoning at the level of assertion-conditions rather than bring it at
the level of proof-objects. Only with Γ empty this formula will then reduce
to the conditions for 2(A true), which provides again the translation to the
dual operator. Otherwise, it means that truth is preserved under certain
knowledge states in which the agent can formulate the appropriate condi-
tions that need to be satisﬁed (where Γ = (A1 true, . . . , An true), n ≥ 1),
27This interpretation appears to me slightly more eﬀective then the one given in
Pfenning and Davies (2001). In this latter work, the context of hypotheses corresponds
to a description of the knowledge of a given world; A valid judgement A is one of the
form `A is true in a world about which we know nothing.' This interpretation reﬂects the
knowing subject's attitude towards the apodictic judgment. Nonetheless, it is diﬃcult
to understand the formulation of the required demonstration in such unknown world. It
seems more intuitive to understand emptiness of a context as indiﬀerence with respect to
the required conditions; Then it follows that the agent knows everything needed for the
due construction.
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but without expressing the appropriate constructions. This leads directly
to a treatment of derivations from open assumptions.28
In Pfenning and Davies (2001), the knowledge that A is possibly true
corresponds to the existence of a world in which A is true but nothing else
is known; this allows to assume that A is true and that (any) C is pos-
sible. This let to draw conclusions on the possibility of the propositional
content C. In section 4, I shall show how appropriate structural rules can be
formulated for a judgemental possibility operator that preserves the mean-
ing of conditions for hypothetical judgements.29 Under such interpretation,
one focuses therefore on the diﬀerent epistemic conditions at the basis of
categorical and dependent judgements, justifying the conceptual distinction
between unveriﬁed and veriﬁed assumptions within the process of proving.
An agent who is always able to verify the assumptions in proof-procedures,
28From this conceptual justiﬁcation we introduce the role of the possibility operator for
judgements. The syntactic justiﬁcation obviously requires a system in which terms for
the type of propositions can be given both as proper constructions and as assumptions.
This clearly would weaken the construcitve nature of the system at least for the module
of the language that allows truth to be predicated of non properly proved (assumed)
contents. This aim, only sketched in a later section, lies outside of the scope of the
present contribution and is addressed in complementary research.
29The interpretation of modalities in the form of propositions 5 and 7 presents the
immediate and intuitive correspondence also with an intuitionistic model for Kripke se-
mantics, requiring a tuple 〈W,≤, R, v〉 where R is the usual accessibility relation over
the ordered set of worlds W,≤, with worlds being intended as epistemic states, and the
function v evaluating necessity and possibility formulas as accessibility respectively in all
and in some orderly accessible world. Under the epistemic reading, assertion conditions
are reduced to the accessibility relations on epistemic states for the formulas KaA (agent
a knows A) and BaA (agent a believes A), where epistemic states substitute `ontologi-
cal worlds' and the semantic deﬁnition on K/B-operators are dictated by the diﬀerent
clauses for deﬁning respectively proven and assumed truths. This gives also a new im-
pulse on the distinction between knowledge and belief, started with Hintikka (1962),
where the system S4 is chosen to express both knowledge/belief of a propositional con-
tent as compatibility with previous knowledge/belief; Compatibility amounts in turn to
nothing else than accessibility by an epistemic relation on worlds. Even stronger systems
have been proposed: in van der Hoek (1996) the system S4.3; in Fagin et al. (1995) and
van Ditmarsch et al. (2006) the system S5 to include negative introspection. In general,
in epistemic logics the meaning of necessity and possibility for epistemic states has been
variously interpreted: Sometimes one speaks in terms of the distinction between knowl-
edge and belief; or corresponding notions of hard/soft information are called upon; or
one analyzes the persistence of the given contents in possible epistemic alternatives. In
turn, knowledge is sometimes interpreted as a strong notion that requires alternatively
truth, correctness or veriﬁcation on propositional contents; whereas belief asks for some
sort of individual, weak conﬁrmation attached to contents. The standard interpretation
of accessibility on propositional contents is preserved in the judgemental interpretation
from Pfenning and Davies (2001), where modal propositional operators are still present,
and no full explanation of the corresponding epistemic attitudes for the ﬁrst-person per-
spective approach is required. Such explanation is here obtained by an analysis of the
veriﬁcation principle of truth deﬁning knowledge under conditions.
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is an ideal knower; A real knower shall often be in the condition of formu-
lating contents only assuming their conditions being satisﬁed (e.g., because
so a reliable source says), but in practice being unable to provide appropri-
ate veriﬁcations.30 These are the diﬀerent epistemic attitudes analyzed by
modal judgements. I shall in the following unfold this interpretation and
show how this allows to formulate appropriate deﬁnitions of constructive
epistemic attitudes.
4 The meaning of satisﬁed conditions
The aim of the present section is to complete the process of translating
the meaning of epistemic attitudes into constructive modalities. To for-
mulate such an interpretation, I shall focus on the notion of conditions on
constructions for propositional contents (as suggested by the act/object of
knowledge distinction); This will provide an appropriate syntactic reading
for judgements of the form 2(A true) and 3(A true).
Let us start again from the judgemental reading of the necessity operator
suggested in Sundholm (2003):
4. `A is true' is necessary ⇒ `A is true' is known.
Let us recall that this translation is based on the identity between A true
and Proof(A). The corresponding epistemic attitude for constructive neces-
sity is given by the apodictic judgement in which the truth of A is asserted
under an empty context of conditions (Γ = ∅)A true, where one has re-
duced to implication (and thus also to an empty context of assumptions)
the case of hypothetical reasoning. This means that conditions for the truth
of the propositional content are already satisﬁed by the formulation of the
judgement, which in turn provides an appropriate proof-object.
In correspondence with the previous reading in 5, I shall now focus on
the relation between possibility and conditions via knowledge (rather than
necessity and conditions): If necessity corresponds to knowledge under no
extra conditions (than proof), possibility shall be related to knowledge under
some assertion conditions to be satisﬁed. In both cases, we have a relation
among knowledge and conditions, and the epistemic attitude of knowing
30The issue of reliability of sources is a very important one in this context. Obviously,
e.g. in a mathematical context, researchers rely on each other's knowledge very often, for
example in assuming the content of a given theorem proven by someone else. The gener-
alization here presented, is based on the import of the ﬁrst-person perspective principle,
where the ideal knower may be a given epistemic agent or the whole of an epistemic com-
munity. In each case, it is relevant to stress the diﬀerent values and roles that contents
have in the process of knowledge. A next stage in this research is the analysis of priori-
tized structures of information sources, by which it is possible to formalize the relation of
dependency between the knowing agent and his sources in a particular relevance order.
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agents in the ﬁrst person perspective can be introduced, so that K is no
longer a knowledge-operator, rather an agent-operator:
5′. `A is true' is known ⇔ Agent K has satisﬁed all conditions to know
that A is true.
Under this reading, necessity is reﬂected as actual knowledge in the following
syntactic representation (where J is the judgement stating `A is true' and
Γ a set of assumptions xn :An):31
(2) 2−Rule Γ ` J
2Γ ` 2J
By this rule, one accounts for judgements whose conditions have been veri-
ﬁed, therefore allowing provability of the conclusion. It says that, given the
derivability of the judgement `A is true' under the list of (minimal) condi-
tions expressed by Γ, the satisfaction of proof conditions for each element in
Γ (interpreted as substitutions of proof-variables: ([x1/a1] :A1, . . . [xn/an] :
An)) allows to formulate proof condition a such that it makes A known.32
This 2-Rule is justiﬁed in a diﬀerent way than the necessitation rule intro-
duced in Pfenning and Davies (2001). In the latter, an introduction rule for
(contextual) boxed formulas has the following form:33
(3)
∆; · ` J
∆; Γ ` 2J
it means that propositional necessity is implied by judgmental validity: If J
is justiﬁed by any context, then it is necessarily justiﬁed. The corresponding
elimination rule allows to use a judgement J as an assumption in context
once 2J has been derived:
(4)
∆; Γ ` 2J ∆, J,Γ ` J1
∆; Γ ` J1
which means to extend contexts in terms of proved formulas. Obviously,
this is valid also in our interpretation: By the previous 2-Rule in equation
2, the derivation of the formula 2J means that related judgmental assertion
31See Bellin et al. (2001).
32For the problem of composition of boxed formulas see de Paiva (2003).
33In the following, the original notation from Pfenning and Davies (2001) has been
modiﬁed to conform to ours. J is equivalent to A true expressed on empty context,
from which one can infer A valid, i.e. judgmental necessity; their 2J is equivalent to
(2A) true and it refers to the propositional form of necessity  whereas we always look
at judgements of the form 2(A true). The notation `·' refers to an empty context.
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conditions (in contexts) have all been boxed (proved), therefore the content
of J can be safely used in a context of assumptions.34 The extension of
context by new formulas still preserves derivability of 2J if its minimal
conditions have been satisﬁed, provided that no contradictory extension
can be allowed of the initial context.
An important issue at this stage is the iteration of the necessity operator,
which is usually interpreted as positive introspection by axiom 4 in epistemic
logic, and as exponentiation in the arithmetical interpretation of provability.
According to the previous analysis introducing the ﬁrst-person perspective
on knowing acts, one can easily substitute justiﬁed truth by satisfaction of
categorical constructions by means of the necessity operator and to extend
it by adding explicitly an index that expresses the knowing agent:
4′. 2(A true)⇔ 2K(A true).
This formulation says that `A is true' is necessary if and only if there is
an agent K satisfying all the due conditions in order to formulate a proof
for A. Provided 2(A true) is justiﬁed by a formula a :A, the identity with
the operator 2K allows the reduction to the standard possible iteration of
modalities. That is, the following derivation is sound:
1 a :A PREM
2 A true veriﬁcation principle of truth
3 2(A true) (5)
4 K(A true) (4)
5 2K(A true) (4′)
6 2K2(A true) (4, 5)
7 2K2K(A true) (4′)
The formula 2K2(A true), as the basic formulation for the iteration of
modalities in the perspective of epistemic attitudes, says that `Agent K
knows that she has a proof object for A.' The formula 4′ allows to re-
duce this to the usual positive introspection, being existence of a proof-
object admissible only if an agent K is able to formulate it. Even though
the reduction is admissible for proven contents (necessity judgements), the
meta-theoretical structure is crucial with respect to the iteration of the
3-operator: When switching to knowledge of the conditions that make a
hypothetical judgement true, one cannot express them  as in the previous
34In the following section I shall introduce hypotheses by a formal rule in the style of
Pfenning and Davies (2001) but with the basic diﬀerence of formulating it both for the
2 and the 3 version (reﬂecting the veriﬁed/unveriﬁed distinction).
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case  by iteration of 2K , which implies direct satisfaction (as a provability
operator). From the present perspective, if one wants to preserve the dif-
ferent attitudes expressed as `knowing that' and `assuming that' (otherwise
also expressible as: `receiveing the information that'), it is crucial to ex-
press the diﬀerence between conditions for knowing and conditions for the
possibility of a propositional content.35
As I hope to make clear in what follows, there are two sorts of desiderata
that one wants to satisfy when the interpretation of necessity is connected
to the veriﬁcation procedure of assertion conditions:
• to make the necessitation of the consequent dependent on the veriﬁca-
tion of the assumptions; This is formally obtained by the introduction
rule for 2J ;
• consequently, to provide a 3-introduction rule as an appropriate coun-
terpart of the 2-elimination rule: Not only one wants to be able to
extend contexts by valid judgments, rather one also wants to make
explicit extensions of contexts by unveriﬁed assumptions, preserving
their epistemic value in the conclusion.
5 Interpreting possibility as satisﬁable conditions
In correspondence with the list 1− 3 of interpretations of necessity given in
Sundholm (2003), the following list of meanings for possibility are formu-
lated:
1′. Possibly A is true;
2′. A is possibly true;
3′. `A is true' is possible.
As in the previous analysis, let us focus on the judgemental form 3′, to
show how it corresponds to a reading in terms of assertion conditions. The
proper counterpart to the notion of apodictic judgement  covering also the
notion of judgement formulated under satisﬁed conditions  is obviously the
one of hypothetical judgement with open assumptions: what is known to be
35This argument is particularly relevant in view of the development of a multi-agent
system, by which one wants to formulate knowledge of a propositional content possessed
by one agent and transmitted to another (which might not possess the corresponding veri-
ﬁcation object). This point is obviously linked to the already mentioned problem of solip-
sism and to the resulting epistemic attitude of `becoming informed,' see Primiero (2009).
More on this in the concluding section. Thanks to Bjørn Jespersen, for urging an exposi-
tion of the problem of introspection at this particular stage of the discussion on epistemic
modalities.
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so, but can be known to be otherwise; In particular, it can be otherwise if
its conditions are not satisﬁed. The ﬁnal aim is therefore to explicitate the
appropriate epistemic attitude formulated by the constructive interpretation
of hypothetical judgement under the formulation of the possibility modality.
The sentence in 5′ from the previous section, implicitly expressing the
condition on the formula `Proof(A) exists' as the categorical judgement
of the form `a is a proof for A' (a : A), turns explicitly as follows in the
interpretation of truth under assumptions:
5′′. `A is true' is known, provided knowledge of contents (A1, . . . , An) ⇔
Agent K knows that A is true, if K satisﬁes conditions (A1, . . . , An).
The case of 5′′ refers (explicitly) to a hypothetical judgement of the form
`provided that (all and only) constructions a1 for A1 up to an for An are
satisﬁed, a is a proof for A.' In this last reading, one implicitly refers to
a minimality property on the conditions needed to satisfy the veriﬁcation
of A; More to the point, deviating from the strictly constructive meaning
of hypothetical judgements, one allows here the formulation of construction
a assuming that constructions a1, . . . , an are given. The constructive in-
terdeﬁnability of possibility and necessity is correspondingly translated as
follows:
6′. 3(A true) ⇔ in some minimal world the conditions for A true are
satisﬁed
3(A true)⇔ ∃Γ(¬2((Γ)¬A true)).
The previous means that, considering conditions for hypothetical judge-
ments, there is a list of assumptions Γ = (A1, . . . , An) such that if these are
veriﬁed, no pair composed with them and a construction a can be formu-
lated such that ¬A holds true. Consider that, according to this translation
of possibility under assertion conditions and for the forthcoming analysis,
our 3A collapses into the standard possibility operator of modal logic only
when Γ = ∅ (that is only for the case of categorical apodictic judgement).
The corresponding positive reading under assertability conditions is as
follows:
7′. If (all and only) conditions Γ = (A1, . . . , An) are satisﬁed, a proof can
be formulated such that agent K knows that A
∃Γ, s.t. (Γ)a :A and K(Γ)⇔ K(A true).
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The explanation of assertion conditions for possibility ﬁnally amounts to:
8. `A is true' is knowable ⇔ Conditions for A are satisﬁable
3(A true)⇔ ∃Γ, s.t. (Γ)a :A and 3(Γ).
The latter in turn means that a list of assumptions can be formulated such
that its knowledge makes A true, and thus A is coherently assertable in a
hypothetical context (again, only in the case Γ = ∅ the previous reduces to
the case of the apodictic judgement). Under the ﬁrst person perspective in-
terpretation and the reading of conditions on constructions for judgements,
knowability of `A is true' means that A can be satisﬁed, and therefore it
can be used to satisfy conditions on further constructions, as explained in
the conceptual order among constructions and conditions in the previous
section.
The deﬁnition given in Pfenning and Davies (2001) of possibility judg-
ments valid under assumptions is again a useful starting point for a bet-
ter understanding of our notion of possible knowledge. Their deﬁnition
preserves possibility under validity (which is intuitive, because it allows
veriﬁed formulas to be formulated in hypothetical contexts), and it de-
ﬁnes possibility with necessity as a substitution principle. The calculus
in Pfenning and Davies (2001) deﬁnes a propositional operator (3) along
with a judgemental predicate (poss):
• If Γ ` A true then Γ ` A poss;
• If Γ ` A poss and A true ` C poss then Γ ` C poss.
In this deﬁnition, the poss predicate is judgemental in the same sense the
true predicate is judgemental, that is, it forms a judgement A poss. Its
interpretation based on necessity is obtained by allowing assumptions about
validity (where, again, validity is interpreted as necessity):
• If ∆; Γ ` A poss and ∆;A true ` C poss, then ∆; Γ ` C poss.
In the present context I focus instead on the judgemental possibility in-
tended as possibility applied to a judgement: 3(A true). The main prop-
erty in common among the two analyses is that assumptions of validity (i.e.
formulas A true in contexts) are extended in order to derive further possible
contents (formulas C poss in the analysis from Pfenning and Davies (2001);
formulas of the form 3(A true) in the present context36). This desirable
36It is not my aim here to investigate to which extent the judgemental formulation
C poss is relevantly diﬀerent from the propositional 3C in Pfenning and Davies (2001).
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property is complementary to the 2-elimination rule in the previous anal-
ysis of the necessitation procedure. The validity of assumptions considered
in Pfenning and Davies (2001) corresponds to our explicit formulation of
veriﬁed assumptions, namely the derivation-tree that goes from Γ to 2Γ,
where Γ = (x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An). The extension that preserves unveriﬁed
assumptions, inducing possibility on the conclusion, is given as follows (as
in the previous rule, J stands for a formula of the form A true):
(5) 3−Rule Γ, J1 ` J2
2Γ,3J1 ` 3J2.
This reading extends the previous interpretation of necessity as proof-
conditions to the assertability conditions of hypothetical judgements: It
preserves the formulation of knowledge contents epistemically weaker than
strictly proved ones. Possibility expresses thus  in the present context 
the knowability of contents under assumption of appropriate assertion con-
ditions.37 This second rule accounts therefore for the transmission of con-
tents in the knowledge frame without explicit proof/veriﬁcation, by referring
to the epistemic modality expressed by the 3-operator.38 This formulation
has the corresponding agent-based abbreviation of the formula at 7:
7′′. 3(A true)⇔ 3K(A true)
saying that `A is true' is possible if and only if there is an agent K who can
formulate the due conditions needed to assert that A is true. This condition
expresses the ability to tell what would be needed in order to know that
A (without the veriﬁcation procedure required by the corresponding neces-
sitation attitude); The object of knowledge for the agent's epistemic state
is obviously given by the formulation of construction a under conditions in
Γ.39
37This rule is introduced also for the calculus presented in Bellin et al. (2001). The
modal analysis presented in Primiero (2009) extends the application to the syntactic-
semantic method of CTT in the same direction, and as such it provides an adequate
modal reading of the constructive calculus of dependent judgements. It shows how to
interpret axiom B as the core of S4 in which the logic of dependent proofs can be
formulated.
38The procedure of transmission of contents (already mentioned in relation with the
problem of solipsism and introspection) is not analyzed in the present paper, but it
describes in an intuitive way the various processes of communication based on reliability,
trust, signed messages. An extension of the present framework on the basis of prioritized
contexts shall cover this important aspect of multi-agent knowledge processes. See the
ﬁnal section for some further remarks.
39It is maybe useful to mention that the identiﬁcation of the notion of dependent
condition with the B-axiom from Primiero (2009), referred to in footnote 37, is at this
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To sum up, consider the third reading of the 2 operator in its application
to the judgemental form (`A is true' is necessary) from the previous section.
It satisﬁes the notion of apodictic judgement: A proposition known to be
true and which cannot be otherwise, being its assertion conditions neces-
sarily satisﬁed. The relation here described is of an analytical nature. The
role of the 3-rule is complementary. It refers to knowledge assertions for-
mulated on the basis of a set of assumptions: If knowing the truth of a
formula depends on the validity of a set of assumptions, then the instantia-
tion of these assumptions constraints to the knowledge of the given formula.
The epistemic value of open assumptions expresses the notion of acquired
information, where contents that might not be explicitly veriﬁed are used
to coherently extend a knowledge base. If the derivability of a judgement
is valid under extension of its assertion conditions by a further judgement,
then the inferred judgement becomes dependent on the veriﬁcation of the
new assumptions. The relation here described is of a synthetic nature.
6 The formal system
I shall now brieﬂy formulate the formal language for the calculus of modal
dependent judgements. Standard types for propositions and formulas in
contexts are introduced as axioms. Constructed formulas are standardly
given by propositional closure. Judgments formulated within a context are
considered assumptions or hypotheses are introduced in terms of elements
of the set of proof-variables (V ar = {x1, . . . , xn}); judgments for the prop :
type are justiﬁed in terms of elements of the set of proof-constants (Con =
{a1, . . . , an}). In order to satisfy the requirement on non-reducibility of
the former to the latter and thus to the implicational relation, one needs to
restrict the truth relation for categorical judgements and to allow hypotheses
to be of the type of propositions without appropriate construction being
already provided. The standard judgemental grammar is then extended
by using a diﬀerent truth predicate when introduced by non-contradictory
assumptions; ﬁnally, modal judgements are introduced:40
stage easily justiﬁed: A → 23A means that the truth of A implies that the assertion
conditions for A (i.e. formally 3A) have been entirely veriﬁed (i.e. the necessitation
imposed by the 2-operator).
40An extended version of the following formal analysis is contained in





J ::= A true | (A1 ∧A2) true | (A1 ∨A2) true | (A1 ⊃ A2) true | (A ⊃⊥) true;
a :A := A true
(¬(A ⊃⊥)) ⊃ x :A := A true∗
Γ,∆:context
Γ ::= (x1 :A1, . . . , xn :An); ∆ ::= (xn+1 :An+1);
mod(J) ::= 2J | 3J.
Whereas Introduction and Elimination Rules for the propositional connec-
tives are standard, let us mention here only the formulation of rules for
modal judgments. The standard hypothesis rule will be extended by rules
for introducing modal judgments as veriﬁed/unveriﬁed assumptions; I shall





The 2- and 3-Rules are ﬁnally given as follows:
(8) 2− Rule Introduction Γ ` J
2Γ ` 2J
(9) 2− Rule Elimination 2Γ ` 2J
Γ,∆ ` J
(10) 3− Rule Introduction Γ, J1 ` J2
2Γ,3J1 ` 3J2
(11) 3− Rule Elimination Γ,∆ ` J1 2Γ,3J1 ` 3J2
Γ,∆ ` J2
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7 Sensible extensions for the epistemic attitudes
framework
The analysis of epistemic possibility carried out in the present contribution
lies crucially on the understanding of the notion of knowledge and the related
necessitation rule. In particular, it refers to the role of assumptions and
the explanation of the notion of dependent derivation. The introduction
of the latter (which in CTT is completely satisﬁed by the formulation of
dependent types with substitution rules on place-holders) requires that the
implicational relation from truth to necessary truth be translated in terms
of the corresponding epistemic version: From known content to necessarily
known content. This relation is weakened in view of the formulation of
proven contents under open assumptions.41
A calculus that includes categorical and dependent (open) judgements
needs to be appropriately tuned with respect to the mentioned epistemic
modalities. The standard constructivist view on hypothetical reasoning
makes knowledge of the conclusion dependent on knowledge of the premises,
thus preserving knowability.42 In the present context, the role of assump-
tions is taken in a more strict sense: By the use of modalities, one is able
to import in the language the distinction between veriﬁed premises and
unveriﬁed assumptions, reﬂected by the corresponding epistemic attitudes
formulated by the knowing agent. Moreover, it is well-known that dependent
knowledge in this sense describes the kind of eﬀective knowledge processes
advocated e.g. by natural deduction systems and derivations by contexts.
The introduced modal rules are equivalent to those in Bellin et al. (2001)
for the calculus of constructive modal logic IK, extended by the needed hy-
pothesis rules. In such a system, axioms for intuitionistic logic hold, plus an
axiom that allows for the distribution of the 2-operator on implication; On
the other hand, distribution of the 3-operator on disjunction is discarded.
The further step of this research is obviously represented by the formulation
of a corresponding Constructive Kripke semantics, that be sound and com-
plete with respect to the syntactic representation here introduced. It seems
safe at this stage to suggest that such semantics might be deﬁned by a set of
diﬀerent accessibility relations on a subset of the worlds representing those
where contents would hold, were the appropriate conditions be satisﬁed.43
A recent result in Kramer (2008) has shown the reducibility of prov-
ability to knowledge, referring to the identity between provability and a
41See Hakli and Negri (2008) for the role of this distinction in the formulation of the
Deduction Theorem. In Primiero (2009) I have considered the relevance of this distinction
for the problem of logical omniscience.
42See Martin-Löf (1996), Sundholm (1997).
43See Primiero (Technical Report 2/09)
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combination of individual knowledge (knowledge of messages), plain propo-
sitional knowledge, common knowledge (propositional knowledge shared in
a community of agents) and a new kind of knowledge, namely adductive
knowledge (propositional knowledge contingent on the adduction of certain
individual knowledge, e.g. through oracle invocation).44 This shows that,
in the context of information exchange for multi-agent systems, the notion of
knowledge requires transfer of (signed) messages and (signed) proofs. This
reﬂects the very same distinction here underlined between the epistemic at-
titudes towards proved and assumed contents. In turn, this suggests that a
modal type-theoretical framework, including appropriate judgments for ne-
cessity and possibility, can be extended in view of a contextual dynamics to
a multi-modal version. In this way, the role of messages is played by update
dynamic operations with assumed formulas in contexts. The corresponding
semantic interpretation would be designed by a set of indexed accessibility
relations (for the agents) on the subset of possible worlds, on whose basis
respectively distributed and common knowledge can be modelled.
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